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United States v. Ross: The Supreme Court
Redefines the Scope of Warrantless Searches
Under the Automobile Exception
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the Constitution prohibits unreason-
able searches and seizures.' It is well established that under most
circumstances a warrant is required to conduct a reasonable
search.2 The warrant is a procedural safeguard which is designed
to protect individual liberty by insuring that probable cause3 will
be assessed by a neutral and detached magistrate.4
Despite the importance of the warrant requirement, the Supreme
Court has determined that under some circumstances warrantless
searches are constitutionally permissible. 5 A body of exceptions to
the warrant requirement has evolved through judicial declara-
1. The text of the fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The preeminence of the warrant
requirement is attributable to several factors, e.g., 1) a warrant limits the concentration of
power held by law enforcement officials and thereby helps prevent unreasonable searches
from occurring, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); 2) a
warrant prevents ad hoc evaluation from coloring the estimation of probable cause, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
3. What constitutes probable cause is difficult to discern. See Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (probable cause means something more than mere suspicion). See
also Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 268 (5th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as KAMIsAR] (defining probable cause to search as a "substantial probabil-
ity that certain items are the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime and that these
items are presently to be found at a certain place.").
4. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences reasonable men draw from the evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
5. The Supreme Court, however, has exhibited a strong preference for search warrants.
See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
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tion.6 Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
unless justified by one of the Court's established exceptions. 7
Automobile searches constitute one such exception to the war-
rant requirement.8 From its inception, this exception was applied
by the courts with little difficulty until recent years. Recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, have created uncertainty both
as to the requisites necessary to invoke the exception,9 as well as to
the exception's permissible scope.10 The Court's ambiguous and
often inconsistent opinions have confused and frustrated law
enforcement officers, courts, practitioners, and legal scholars."
The Supreme Court's most recent decisions have focused on the
issue of whether containers found during an automobile search
can themselves be searched without a warrant.12 While the Court
has generally accepted that a search pursuant to the automobile
exception encompasses all integral parts of the vehicle, 13 the issue
of secondary container searches has proven to be problematic.
This issue has generated a series of decisions as the Court has
attempted to formulate a clear rule which may be applied consis-
tently in varying circumstances. Unfortunately, the Court's past
efforts seem to have exacerbated the already existing confusion. 4
6. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory searches); Almeida
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border and customs searches); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(stop and frisk); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(automobile searches); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (search incident to
arrest). But see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)(where the Court found
insufficient justifications for warrantless searches).
7. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,390 (1978); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364,381 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
8. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
9. See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42-100 and accompanying text.
11. The degree of confusion in this area is exemplified by the following comment- "I
recognize... that the law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably
confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone
on how these cases should be decided." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring).
12. See infra notes 42-100.
13. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of concealed compartment
hidden under the dashboard); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (search of car's
trunk); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of interior of car's upholstery).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78, 93-98.
United States v. Ross
In United States v. Ross,15 the Supreme Court attempted to put
an end to the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the container
search issue. In that case, the Court announced a "bright line" 16
rule to govern the permissibility of container searches under the
automobile exception. 17 The Court radically departed from its
most recent precedent and extended the scope of the automobile
exception to all secondary containers.' 8
This article will first discuss the background and development of
the automobile exception. It will then examine the Supreme Court's
difficulty in establishing guidelines for the exception's application.
The three major "container cases" which preceded the Court's
most recent decision will be considered. In light of this back-
ground, this article will analyze the decision in United States v.
Ross, focusing on Ross's impact on established precedent. Finally,
the article will consider the Supreme Court's probable future course
on unresolved issues.
BACKGROUND
The Automobile Exception
The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement
originated in Carroll v. United States.19 In Carroll, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless, probable cause
search of an automobile and set out the primary justification for
15. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
16. Generally, this term refers to rules which are clear and capable of easy application
by police. The need for bright line rules in the area of the fourth amendment is summed up
by the following comment:
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hair-line distinctions, may be the sort
of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.'
LaFave, Case-by-Case Adjudication Versus "Standardized Procedures:" The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Or. REv. 127, 141. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's quest
for bright lines in the context of the fourth amendment, see LaFave, The Fourth Amend-
ment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PrIT L
REv. 307 (1982).
17. See infra text accompanying note 113.
18. See infra text accompanying note 114.
19. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Hence, the automobile exception is also referred to as the Carroll
doctrine.
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the automobile exception. 20 Essentially, the Court found a consti-
tutionally significant difference between the search of fixed pre-
mises, for which a warrant can easily be obtained, and the search
of a vehicle, which can easily be moved from the jurisdiction before
a warrant can be secured.21 Carroll established that the automo-
bile's mobility created a practical exigency which supplied the
primary justification for dispensing with the warrant requirement. 22
The Carroll doctrine, however, was not without limits. The Court
emphasized that the automobile exception only applied where se-
curing a warrant would be impracticable. 23 The Court declared
that when "the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it
must be used ... "24
The Supreme Court's next major decision in this area did not
come until Chambers v. Maroney.25 Chambers seemed to depart
from the principles laid down in Carroll and to set the automobile
exception on a new footing. In Chambers, the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless automobile search which had been con-
ducted at the station house after the seizure of the vehicle and the
arrest of its occupants.26 With the automobile already in police
custody, neither did a practical exigency exist due to the automo-
20. Id. at 147. In Carroll, police had conducted the warrantless search pursuant to
specific statutory authorization. See National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. II, § 26, 41 Stat.
315, 316 (1919) (repealed 1935). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statu-
tory provision and thereby upheld the constitutionality of the warrantless search. 267 U.S.
at 147.
21. Id. at 153. The Court supported this distinction with constitutional justification
found in congressional legislation which was passed contemporaneously with the fourth
amendment. Justice Taft wrote:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house
or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id.
22. Id. at 156.
23. The Supreme Court has not indicated precisely what is meant by this term. In the
context of Carroll, it seems to mean circumstances where the police risk the loss of opportun-
ity to search if required to obtain a warrant.
24. 267 U.S. at 156.
25. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In the interim between Carroll and Chambers, the automobile
exception was applied primarily to cases involving the illegal transport of liquor. See, e.g.,
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
26. 399 U.S. at 52. In Chambers, the vehicle had been stopped on the roadway as had the
vehicle in Carroll. Instead of conducting an immediate search, however, the police officers
brought the vehicle back to the station house and then conducted the search. Id. at 44.
[Vol. 14
United States v. Ross
bile's mobility, nor would the procurement of a warrant be imprac-
ticable. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the search on the
basis of the Carroll doctrine. The Court concluded that the prob-
able cause and mobility which would have justified an on-the-
scene search still obtained at the station house.27 Thus, the Court
did not find it significant that the police had had ample opportun-
ity to obtain a warrant after the vehicle's seizure without risk of
losing the opportunity to search. This holding was in obvious dis-
regard of Carroll's directive that, whenever reasonably practica-
ble, a warrant must be obtained.28 As a result, Chambers represents
an extension of the applicability of the automobile exception
beyond the boundaries set in Carroll.29
The Supreme Court's next decision concerning the application of
the automobile exception generated confusion regarding the status
of Carroll's impracticability requirement. In Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,30 the Court invalidated a warrantless automobile
search that was conducted at the station house after seizure of the
vehicle.31 The Court held that the automobile exception was inap-
plicable because it would have been reasonably practicable for the
police to secure a warrant before searching the vehicle.32 Thus, the
Coolidge decision was premised on the precise consideration which
the Chambers Court appeared to have ignored. Consequently, the
rationales of Chambers and Coolidge were irreconcilable, 33 and
27. Id. at 52. The Court never adequately explained why mobility was still present after
the seizure.
28. See supra text accompanying note 24.
29. See W. LAFAvE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE. A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.2, at 514 (1978).
30. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
31. Id. at 462. In Coolidge, the defendant was arrested for murder. Police had probable
cause to search his automobile and obtained a search warrant which was later invalidated.
The automobile was seized from the defendant's residence and brought to the police station
where a search was conducted two days later.
32. Id. The Court stated-
The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amend-
ment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in the meaning of
this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of Carroll v. United States - no
alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a
hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates
waiting to move the evidence not even the inconvenience of a special police detail
to guard the immobilized automobile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legal
imagination can this be made into a case where 'it is not practicable to secure a
warrant,' and the 'automobile exception,' despite its label, is simply irrelevant.
Id. at 461-62. This issue was decided by a plurality of the Court- Stevens, J., joined by
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, J.J.
33. See KAMISAR, supra note 3, at 339 n. 1.
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left courts with little guidance as to the proper application of the
automobile exception. 34
In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Supreme Court subsequently exacer-
bated the already existing confusion over the proper criteria for
determining the applicability of the automobile exception.35 In
Cardwell the Court upheld the warrantless search of the exterior of
an automobile that had been seized from a public parking lot.36
The Court declared that the nature of an automobile imparts a
lesser expectation of privacy3 7 to its owner, than do other constitu-
tionally protected areas.38 Automobiles, therefore, are entitled to a
lesser degree of constitutional protection. The Court explained
that, because an automobile's primary function is transportation,
it rarely serves as a repository for personal effects. 39 In addition,
an automobile is inherently less private because it travels on pub-
lic thoroughfares where both its occupants and contents are in
plain view.40 Thus, Cardwell added a new consideration to the
analysis but did not clarify the ambiguity generated by Chambers
and Coolidge.41
34. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Col-
clough, 549 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1977); Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975); United
States v. Patterson, 495 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Young, 489 F.2d 914 (6th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1973); Carlton v. Estelle, 480 F.2d
759 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
36. Id. at 590.
37. The concept of an expectation of privacy as a basis for determining fourth amend-
ment protection came into existence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz held
that a phone booth was a constitutionally protected area because the fourth amendment
"protects people, not places." Id. at 351. Since the individual had exhibited an expectation
that his conversations would remain private, he was entitled to fourth amendment protec-
tion. Id. at 351-52. For further consideration of this standard for determining fourth
amendment protection, see Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1968 SuP. Cr. REV. 133; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy
Test, 76 MICH. L REV. 154 (1977).
38. 417 U.S. at 590.
39. Id.
40. Id. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment
protection (citation omitted).").
41. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. For critical analyses of these decisions, see
generally Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980); Comment, The Automobile Exception" A Contradiction in Fourth
Amendment Principles, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933 (1980). The Court did decide one case
subsequent to these decisions concerning this issue. In Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), a
case factually similar to Chambers, the Court reaffirmed the Chambers holding with little
United States v. Ross
It was with this background that the Supreme Court first
encountered a unique issue related to the automobile exception.
This issue involved the permissible scope of a warrantless search
conducted pursuant to the automobile exception. Without resolving
the seemingly inconsistent rationales of Chambers and Coolidge
or clearly defining the implications of the lesser expectation of
privacy recognized in Cardwell, the Court embarked on a series of
decisions in an effort to determine whether secondary containers
found in an automobile during a warrantless search, could be
searched pursuant to the automobile exception. This issue proved
to be even more troublesome than had the application of the auto-
mobile exception itself.
THE CONTAINER CASES
United States v. Chadwick
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of warrantless con-
tainer searches in United States v. Chadwick.42 The search in
Chadwick was not performed pursuant to the automobile excep-
tion, but was merely a warrantless search of a container.43 Never-
theless, the decision is significant because the rationale used by
the Court could apply equally to containers searched under the
automobile exception. 44
Chadwick involved the warrantless probable cause search of a
double-locked footlocker.45 The Court invalidated the search and
held that it was unreasonable because it was conducted without a
warrant.46 According to the Court, the individuals, having chosen
to place the contents of the footlocker in such a container,47 had
discussion. There, as in Chambers, the search occurred at the station house after the vehi-
cle's seizure where no practical exigency was present.
42. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
43. While the government had argued the applicability of the automobile exception at
the district court and court of appeals levels, this argument, twice rejected, was not pursued
at the Supreme Court level. See United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773,782 (lst Cir. 1976);
United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763, 771 (D. Mass. 1975). See also infra note 45.
44. This was the precise nature of the uncertainty created by Chadwick. See infra notes
58-59 and accompanying text.
45. 433 U.S. at 4. At the time the footlocker was seized it was being placed in the trunk of
an automobile. The Court pointed out that it was not being argued that the footlocker's brief
contact with the car made it an automobile search. Id. at 11.
46. Id. The Court determined that there was no exigency because, at the time the search
took place, all suspects were under arrest and the footlocker had been transported to the
Boston Federal Building under the exclusive control of federal agents. Id. at 4.
47. The Court emphasized that this container was a 200 pound double-locked footlocker
1982]
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manifested an expectation of privacy in those items.48 The Court
concluded, therefore, that the police could not intrude into this
constitutionally protected area without first obtaining a warrant.49
In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the two major argu-
ments advanced by the government in an attempt to justify the
search. The first argument, that the fourth amendment only pro-
tects interests traditionally identified with the home, was found
untenable.50 The Court reemphasized that fourth amendment pro-
tection is not determined by the place searched, but rather by the
nature of the individual's privacy interest.51 Second, the Court
rejected the argument that the rationale of the automobile excep-
tion should be extended to permit the search of all movable person-
alty.52 Such an extension was unwarranted because the justifica-
tions which support the automobile exception do not support a
similar exception for all movables;53 that is, the diminished expec-
tation of privacy which attaches to automobiles is not characteris-
tic of secondary containers.5 4 In addition, because movable items
can easily be seized and immobilized until a warrant is secured,55
the practical mobility problem which is present in the case of an
but gave no clear indication what role the durability of the container played in its decision.
Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 7. See supra note 37.
49. 433 U.S. at 11. See cases cited supra note 7 and accompanying text.
50. 433 U.S. at 7. After a detailed historical analysis the Court determined that there was
no basis for such a distinction. Id. at 11. In light of established precedent it seems surprising
that the government would even make such an argument. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (upholding warrant requirement for a search of a parked automo-
bile); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (upholding warrant requirement to
open packages sent through the mails); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (uphold-
ing warrant requirement for electronic interception of a conversation in a public phone
booth).
51. 433 U.S. at 7. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52. 433 U.S. at 13.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 13. The Court stated:
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to
respondents' footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a
condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to
regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an auto-
mobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a reposi-
tory of personal effects.
Id.
55. Id. In this case seizure and detention were sufficient measures to safeguard the
contents of the footlocker until a warrant could be obtained and therefore, "it was unreason-
able to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant." Id.
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automobile search does not obtain. 56
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chadwick, lower courts
had almost universally upheld searches of containers under the
automobile exception.57 Chadwick, however, cast doubt on the
correctness of these decisions. Arguably, the Chadwick rationale
could apply to containers found within an automobile as well as
to containers found elsewhere. Chadwick left unclear whether
such containers were subject to searches under the automobile
exception. 58 Lower courts thus reached opposing results in Chad-
wick's application.5 9
Arkansas v. Sanders
Aware of the uncertainty caused by Chadwick, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Arkansas v. Sanders60 to delineate the
proper scope of the Chadwick holding.61 In Sanders, the issue
before the Court was whether police could conduct a warrantless
search of a container under the automobile exception. 62
Sanders involved the warrantless probable cause search of an
unlocked suitcase found in an automobile.63 The purported justifi-
56. Id. The Court noted that secure storage facilities may not be available and the size
and inherent mobility of an automobile make it susceptible to theft or intrusion by vandals.
Id. at 13 n.7.
57. The leading case in this area was United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1974), where the court held that probable cause which justified the initial intrusion into the
automobile also supported the intrusion into any container located therein. Accord United
States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Halliday, 487 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kulp, 365 F.
Supp. 747 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 7.2, at 535.
58. For commentary on the implications of Chadwick, see W. LAFAVE, supra note 29,
§ 7.2, at 538-43; Note, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Persons Lawfully Arrested for
Alleged Possession of Narcotics Have a Privacy Interest in a Footlocker in Their Possession
at the Time of Their Arrest Which Is Protected by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment: United Staes v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977), 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (1978);
Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept: The Unreasonableness
of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. REv. 436 (1978).
59. This conflict is exemplified by United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978)
and United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977). The two circuits applied
Chadwick to similar facts and reached contrary conclusions. The Ninth Circuit held that
Chadwick did not preclude a search of a suitcase under the automobile exception, while the
Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected this result and held that such a search was impermissible
under Chadwick.
60. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
61. Id. at 754. ("We took this case by writ of certiorari ... to resolve some apparent
misunderstanding as to the application of our decision in United States v. Chadwick....").
62. Id.
63. Id. In Sanders, the police received a tip that the defendant would be arriving at the
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cation for the search was the automobile exception.64 The Supreme
Court held that the search of the suitcase without a warrant was
invalid.65 Essentially, the Court determined that the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement applies equally to personal luggage
taken from an automobile and that found in other locations. 66
Thus, the Court extended the Chadwick holding to encompass
luggage found within an automobile during a search pursuant to
the automobile exception.6 7
In reaching this result, the Court relied on a rationale similar to
that used in Chadwick. The Court determined that the justifica-
tions for the automobile exception simply did not support its exten-
sion to secondary containers.68 Containers possess neither the
inherent mobility6 9 nor the diminished privacy interest that are
characteristic of automobiles.70 Therefore, there was no basis
upon which to uphold the warrantless search.71
The Sanders decision clearly established that the warrantless
search of an unlocked suitcase cannot be justified by the automo-
bile exception. 72 The Court's holding was carefully limited to per-
local airport at a specified gate and time, and that he would be carrying a green suitcase
which contained marijuana. With the area under surveillance, the police observed the
defendant arrive carrying the suitcase. They watched as the suspect's companion placed the
suitcase in the trunk of a taxi. They stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport,
searched the unlocked suitcase, and found marijuana. Id. at 755.
64. Id. at 757.
65. Id. at 763-64.
66. Id. at 764.
67. The Court invalidated the approach taken by most courts prior to Chadwick. See
supra note 57, and the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit after Chadwick. See supra note
59.
68. 442 U.S. at 763-65.
69. Id. at 763. The point at which mobility is to be assessed is the point in time imme-
diately before the search. Thus, once police have seized the suitcase, "the extent of its
mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken." Id.
70. Id. at 764. The Court noted that "One is not less inclined to place private, personal
possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather
than transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Id.
71. Id. at 765. The two concurring Justices believed that the majority was wrong in
treating this as an automobile exception case. They asserted that Sanders was indistinguish-
able from Chadwick in that the relationship between the container and the automobile was
merely coincidental. They concurred in the invalidation of this search. They would have
permitted, however, a warrantless search when police have probable cause to search the
entire automobile rather than any particular container. Id. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
72. This holding does not mean, however, that suitcases in automobiles may never be
the subject of warrantless searches, e.g., the preclusion of warrantless border searches of
luggage, which are based on a different exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 764
n.12.
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sonal luggage.7 3 The Court expressly stated in a footnote that the
holding may not be applicable to some containers.7 4 It gave no
indication, however, what standards were to be used in determin-
ing whether a particular container was encompassed by the Sand-
ers rule.75 Due to this ambiguity, Sanders, rather than clear up
Chadwick residue, generated new confusion.7
After Sanders, the courts faced the difficult task of determining
whether a container was encompassed by the Sanders "luggage
rule" or fell instead within the undefined class of containers for
which a warrant was not required.7 7 Not surprisingly, courts var-
ied in their interpretation and application of Sanders,78 rendering
the law of warrantless container searches a case-by-case, container-
by-container, process of adjudication.
Robbins v. California
Once again the Supreme Court was aware of the confusion
created by its most recent decision, and again it granted certiorari
to resolve the continuing uncertainty surrounding the scope of
73. Id. at 764-65. ("[Tlhe very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal
items when one wishes to transport them.").
74. Id. at 764-65n.13. The language of footnote 13 provided:
Notall containers and packages found by the police during the course of a search
will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers
(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot
support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be
inferred from their outward appearance.
Id.
75. Sanders' infamous footnote 13 was to be a consistent source of confusion for lower
courts. See cases cited infra note 78.
76. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 7.2, at 149 (Supp. 1982); Note, Warrantless
Container Searches Under the Automobile and Search Incident Exceptions, 9 FORDHAM
URE. L.J. 185 (1980).
77. The Sanders dissenters foresaw such a problem with the majority's holding. 442 U.S.
at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun felt that the majority opinion had not cleared
up the confusion created by Chadwick, but rather, had created greater difficulties for police,
prosecutors, and the courts. He pointed out that "Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon
to be litigated, are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind
of container." Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980) (Sanders permits
search of two plastic bags, within three brown paper bags, within two more plastic bags).
Daigger v. State, 595 S.W.2d 653 (Ark. 1980) (Sanders does permit the warrantless search of
a purse); Liichow v. State, 228 Md. 502, 419 A.2d 1041 (1980) (Sanders does not permit the
warrantless search of a plastic bag); State v. Duers, 49 N.C. App. 282, 271 S.E.2d 81 (1980)
(Sanders permits the warrantless search of a white plastic bag); State v. Prober, 98 Wis. 2d
345, 297 N.W.2d 1 (1980) (Sanders does not permit the warrantless search of a purse). See
also W. LAFAVE, supra note 29, § 7.2, at 149-50 (Supp. 1982). LaFave concludes that most of
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warrantless searches under the automobile exception. 79 In Rob-
bins v. California,80 the Court attempted to establish how the
Sanders holding applies to containers other than personal luggage.81
Robbins involved warrantless search of two green opaque
plastic bags which were found during a lawful, probable cause
search of an automobile.82 In a plurality opinion,8 3 the Supreme
Court invalidated the warrantless search. 84 The plurality took the
position that all closed containers are equally protected by the
warrant requirement and, therefore, could not be the subject of a
warrantless search under the automobile exception.85 The only
limitation on the plurality's "bright line" rule8 6 was that the war-
these cases can be squared with the following proposition: '"A] warrant is needed to search a
container... only when the container is one that generally serves as a repository for
personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable expectation
that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny." Id.
79. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,423 (1981).
80. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
81. Robbins, however, was distinguishable from Chadwick and Sanders because prob-
able cause focused on the entire automobile rather than a particular container. This distinc-
tion was ignored by Justice Stewart writing for the plurality but was viewed by one dissen-
ter as justifying a contrary result. 453 U.S. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 422. In Robbins, the petitioner was stopped while driving erratically. When he
opened the car door, police officers smelled marijuana and, therefore, had probable cause to
search the automobile. During the search, the officers found two green, plastic-wrapped
packages in a recessed luggage compartment located in the rear of the vehicle. Id. The court
of appeals had upheld the search under Sanders, finding that the contents of the packages
could be inferred from their outward appearance. Thus, the defendant could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the packages. 103 CaL App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr.
780, 783 (1980).
83. Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, White and Marshall, J.J., wrote the plurality opinion;
Burger, C.J., concurred without opinion; Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion; Blackmun, J.,
Rehnquist, J., and Stevens, J., filed dissents.
84. 453 U.S. at 425.
85. Id. The Court relied on the holdings of Chadwick and Sanders and rejected the
contention that the nature of a container may diminish its constitutional protection. Id The
Court determined that placing an item in any closed container manifests the necessary
expectation of privacy under Sanders. Therefore, "once placed within such a container, a
diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 426.
86. The "bright line" approach was obviously aimed at resolving the difficulties created
by Chadwick and Sanders and obviating the need for case-by-case, container-by-container
adjudication of privacy interests. This approach is consistent with the approach taken by
the Court on the same day with respect to the search incident to arrest exception as it
applies to automobiles. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (establishing the rule
that all areas of the car's interior, including secondary containers, may be searched without
a warrant pursuant to the arrest of the car's occupants). For a discussion of the combined
effects of Robbins and Belton, see Comment, Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton:
The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container Searches, 31 Am. U.L. REv. 291 (1982);
Note, Drawing Lines Around the Fourth Amendment Robbins v. California and New York
v. Belton, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 483 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Drawing Lines].
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rant requirement does not apply to containers with such a distinc-
tive configuration that their contents can be discerned from their
outward appearance.8 7
Justice Powell concurred in the result reached by the plurality,
but refused to adopt the "bright line" approach.88 According to
Powell, the proper inquiry under Sanders was whether the nature
of the container indicated that the owner had a privacy interest in
its contents.89 Thus, Powell's position entailed a case-by-case ad-
judication of the expectation of privacy which attaches to various
containers.90 In contrast, the three dissenters 9' in Robbins con-
tended that the automobile exception should encompass all con-
tainers found in an automobile without regard to privacy interests.92
The extent of the confusion in the area of container searches
under the automobile exception is evidenced by the failure of any
opinion in Robbins to attract a majority of the Court. Four
members were of the opinion that a warrant is required to search
any container, while three members would have adopted a con-
trary rule.93 Justice Powell alone advocated that the "bright line"
rule was improper and that case-by-case adjudication was required
instead.94
87. 453 U.S. at 427. This was the construction which the plurality placed on the proble-
matic footnote in Sanders. See supra note 74. The plurality viewed the specific exceptions
listed in the footnote, i.e., a kit of burglar tools and a gun case, as "the very model of
exceptions which prove the rule .. " Id. Thus, only when a container's contents are in
"plain view" can a warrantless search be conducted. Id.
88. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell felt that the plurality's approach
was undesirable because it placed a substantial burden on law enforcement without further-
ing any privacy interests. He stated: "The plurality's 'bright line' rule would extend the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment to every 'closed, opaque container' without
regard to size, shape, or whether common experience would suggest that the owner was
asserting a privacy interst in the contents." Id. at 429 n.1.
89. Id. at 432. Under Powell's analysis the existence of a privacy interest is determined
by whether the container is typically a repository for personal effects or whether it is sealed
in a manner which evidences a privacy interest. Under the facts in Robbins, he therefore
concurred in the result because the package had been carefully wrapped and sealed.
90. Powell's approach was essentially the same as that employed by lower courts after
Sanders. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Drawing Lines,
supra note 86 (where the author advocates a case-by-case, factually sensitive analysis for
container cases under the automobile exception).
91. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens all wrote separate dissents.
92. In the dissenters' view, when the police have probable cause to search an entire
automobile, the exigencies which justify the initial intrusion also justify intrusion into any
containers. 453 U.S. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See supra notes 83,92 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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In light of the internal dissension among the members of the
Court, it is not surprising that Robbins did little to achieve the
Court's goal of clarity. After Robbins, courts still varied in their
treatment of warrantless container searches. Some courts strictly
adhered to the "bright line" rule,95 while others openly doubted the
precedential value of a plurality opinion.96 These latter courts
focused instead on the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
in Justice Powell's concurring opinion.97 In addition, a number of
courts were still uncertain when a container's configuration clearly
announces its contents. 98
The precedential value of Robbins was further drawn into ques-
tion when shortly after the decision was announced the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in United States v. Ross.99 Ross was fac-
tually similar to Robbins and would seem to be controlled by that
case's holding. In granting certiorari, however, the Court expressly
requested that the parties address the question of whether the deci-
95. See, e.g., United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1981) (adopted a broad
definition of container and invalidated a warrantless search of a rolled up rain slicker under
Robbins); Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1981) (warrantless search of
well-packaged bales of marijuana located in the equivalent of a luggage compartment held
invalid under Robbins); United States v. Musick, 534 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (warrant-
less search of an unlocked briefcase found in passenger compartment and a locked attache
case found in the truck invalidated under Robbins).
96. See infra note 97. For a consideration of the weight accorded plurality decisions, see
generally Comment, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80
COLUM. L. REv 756 (1980); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv.
L. REv. 1127 (1981).
97. E.g., United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981) (decided under Powell's
reasonable expectation of privacy test that no warrant was required to search an unsealed
paper bag); Government of Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding
that a grocery bag can be searched under the automobile exception because it does not
carry an expectation of privacy); United States v. Rivera, 654 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981)
(justifying its result under Powell's reasonable expectation of privacy test as well as the
"bright line" rule).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1982). On facts remarkably
similar to Robbins, the court upheld the search of numerous opaque, sealed garbage bags on
the grounds that they were packed with a course substance which was "obviously mari-
juana." In addition to this "distinctive configuration," the intense odor of marijuana
brought the contraband into plain view. Id. at 204. See also Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d
500 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding a warrantless search of burlap-covered bales on the grounds
that some were split open, thereby bringing the contents of all the bales into plain view);
United States v. Cobler, 533 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Va. 1982) (upholding the warrantless search
of one gallon plastic jugs filled with a clear substance on the ground that their contents were
in plain view because of the distinctive odor of whiskey emanating from them).
99. 454 U.S. 891 (1981). Certiorari was granted on October 13, 1981, a little over three
months after Robbins had been decided. Since then, Justice Stewart retired and was replaced
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
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sion in Robbins should be reconsidered. 100 Consequently, the con-
tinuing validity of the Robbins holding was in a state of uncertainty.
UNITED STATES v. Ross:
THE SUPREME COURT'S BRIGHT LINE ANSWER TO
THE PROBLEM OF WARRANTLESS CONTAINER SEARCHES
Factual Background
In Ross, the police received a tip from a reliable informant that
the defendant, Albert Ross, was carrying narcotics in the trunk of
his automobile. 1 1 The police located the defendant's car, parked
and unoccupied, and placed it under surveillance. After leaving the
scene momentarily, the officers returned to find the car proceeding
a short distance from where it had been parked. The police officers
matched the driver's description with that of the suspect and
stopped the automobile. 0 2
After searching both the defendant and the car's interior, 0 3 the
officers placed the defendant under arrest. 0 4 One officer then
opened the trunk of the car and found a closed brown paper bag.
He opened the bag, and discovered a number of glassine bags
containing white powder which later proved to be heroin.105 No
search warrant was ever obtained. 10 6
The district court upheld the warrantless search of the paper
bag.10 7 The court of appeals, however, reversed and held that the
search violated the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 08 A
100. Id.
101. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157,2160(1982). The informant stated that he had
just observed Ross complete a sale and that Ross had told him that there were additional
narcotics in the trunk of Ross's car. Id.
102. Id. The police had received a description of Ross from the informant which matched
that given by police computers.
103. During the search of the car's interior, police discovered a bullet on the front seat
and a pistol in the glove compartment.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
105. Id. At a later station house search, police also discovered a red leather pouch in the
vehicle's trunk. The government conceded to the court of appeals that the pouch was
covered by the Sanders luggage rule. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (en banc).
106. 102. S. Ct. at 2160.
107. Id. Ross was indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia for, among
other things, possession of heroin. Ross moved to suppress the evidence taken from the
paper bag and, after a hearing, the district judge denied the motion. Ross was convicted in a
jury trial. Id.
108. 655 F.2d at 1161. It should be noted that the court of appeals decided Ross before the
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majority'0 9 of that court rejected the idea that there was any con-
stitutionally significant difference between various types of con-
tainers." 0 Therefore, it held that the warrant requirement protects
paper bags in the same way that it protects personal luggage."'
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and upheld the constitutionality of the warrantless search. 11 2 In a
majority opinion, it broadly declared that when the police have
stopped an automobile, having probable cause to believe that con-
traband is located somewhere therein, they may conduct a search
"as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant 'partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched. ' 1 13 Consequently, the
rule established by the Court in Ross permitted the warrantless
search of all closed containers pursuant to the automobile
exception." 4
The Opinion
The majority in Ross offered several lines of reasoning to justify
its "bright line" holding. Initially, the Court determined that the
search of secondary containers under the automobile exception
satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment."15
This premise was based on the assumption that a search of a
secondary container is no greater an intrusion into fourth amend-
ment interests than is the search of other areas which constitute
Robbins decision was announced. In fact, the court of appeals decision in Ross was cited by
the plurality in Robbins. See 453 U.S. at 426-27.
109. Seven justices joined in the appellate court opinion while four justices filed separate
dissents. 655 F.2d at 1160.
110. Id. at 1170. The court foresaw extensive problems for both the police and courts if an
"unworthy container" rule were adopted. The court asked-
Are police to distinguish cotton purse from silk; felt, vinyl, canvas, tinfoil, card-
board, or paper containers from leather;, sacks closed by folding a flap from those
closed with zippers, drawstrings, buttons, snaps, velcro fastenings, or strips of
adhesive tape? Would a Tiffany shopping bag rank with one from the local
supermarket?
Id.
111. Id. at 1161. The court emphasized that the fourth amendment is designed to protect
all persons, "not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in
containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line...." Id.
112. 102 S. Ct. at 2157.
113. Id. at 2159.
114. Id. at 2171. According to the Ross Court, this holding overrules the "disposition" of
Robbins, and some of the "reasoning" in Sanders which was relied on by the Robbins
plurality. Id. at 2172.
115. Id. at 2169.
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the integral parts of a vehicle. 116 Therefore, since these highly
intrusive automobile searches comport with the fourth amend-
ment, searches of secondary containers should also be permissible. 117
The majority next proposed that if the automobile exception is to
have any practical effect, it must encompass closed containers.",
The Court explained that contraband, by its very nature, must be
concealed from public view.119 Objects typically sought in an
automobile search are rarely left in open view. 120 To be of any
practical assistance to the police, the Court concluded that the
automobile exception must encompass secondary containers. 121
Finally, the Ross Court found support for the constitutionality of
warrantless container searches by reference to the scope of searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant. The Court pointed out that once
a warrant has been issued, police are entitled to search any area
where the object of the warrant might be concealed. 122 In the case
of an automobile, police are not restricted to searching the integral
parts of the vehicle but may also open any secondary containers.
The Court concluded that once a legitimate search is under way, 123
distinctions between various containers must give way "to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand."124
In establishing its new rule, the majority in Ross engaged in a
116. Id. The Court referred to several cases where highly intrusive searches of automo-
biles were upheld as reasonable. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of a
concealed compartment under the dashboard of a car); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (search of the interior of a car's upholstery).
117. The Court reasoned:
It would be illogical to assume that the outcome of Chambers - or the outcome of
Carroll itself - would have been different if the police had found the secreted
contraband enclosed within a secondary container and had opened that container
without a warrant. If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the
upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable for them to look
into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was reasonable to open the concealed
compartment in Chambers, it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper
bag crumpled within it.
102 S. Ct. at 2169.
118. Id. at 2170.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Court pointed out that contraband goods are rarely placed in a car unless
they are in some sort of container.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Presumably, the Court is referring to both searches conducted pursuant to a war-
rant, and warrantless searches based upon probable cause as "legitimate" searches.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
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lengthy analysis of fourth amendment precedent in the area of
automobile searches. In the Court's view, Carroll v. United States125
had held simply that a warrantless search of an automobile, sup-
ported by probable cause, is not unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. 126 The Court emphasized that Carroll had not ad-
dressed the question of the permissible scope of a search pursuant
to the automobile exception. 127
The Court noted that its holding was reconcilable with the hold-
ings of United States v. Chadwick 28 and Arkansas v. Sanders. 29
It pointed out that in both of these cases the probable cause which
supported the search had focused on the particular container to be
searched, rather than the automobile as a whole. 130 In contrast,
Ross presented the situation where police had probable cause to
search the entire automobile. The Court viewed this distinction as
constitutionally significant, and hence determined that Chadwick
and Sanders were not controlling.' 3 '
Finally, the Court briefly discussed the plurality opinion in Rob-
bins v. California,32 but did not attempt to reconcile it with the
current holding. 33 Rather, the Court focused on the fact that Rob-
bins was decided without a majority opinion, and the parties in
Robbins had not addressed the issue argued by the parties in
Ross.134
125. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
126. 102. S. Ct. at 2159.
127. Id. The majority pointed to authority subsequent to Carroll in support of its proposi-
tion that the Carroll holding could be read to encompass containers. The Court cited Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938), and Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), cases
decided under Carroll, where searches of secondary containers were upheld. Although the
Court acknowledged that no argument was raised regarding the secondary intrusion into
the containers, it nevertheless concluded that these cases "have much weight" because the
"fact that no such argument was even made illuminates the profession's understanding of
the scope of the search permitted under Carroll." 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
128. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
129. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
130. 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
131. Id. at 2168. The Court did acknowledge that Sanders had broadly suggested that
the automobile exception could never be used to justify the warrantless search of a con-
tainer. Id. at 2167. Apparently, this is the "reasoning" in Sanders which the Ross Court
overruled.
132. 453 U.S. 420(1981).
133. 102 S. Ct. at 2168. In Robbins, as in Ross, probable cause to search focused on the
entire automobile. See supra note 81. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court did not attempt
to reconcile its holding with the contrary holding in Robbins.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 2168. In support of this reasoning, the Court pointed to Powell's concur-
rence in Robbins. Powell had suggested the proper rule should be that when the police have
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The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined in by Justice
Brennan,135 leveled harsh criticism at both the rationale and the
holding of the majority.136 Initially, Marshall attacked the major-
ity's total disregard for the important function which the warrant
requirement serves. 137 In Marshall's view, the warrant require-
ment is critical because it insures that probable cause will be
assessed by a neutral and detached magistrate and thereby pro-
vides significant protections that post-hoc judicial evaluation of
probable cause would not. 38 He pointed out that these protections
are important in the context of the automobile searches, despite the
existence of the automobile exception. 139 Marshall wrote that the
automobile exception is narrow, and should be applicable only
when either mobility 40 or diminished privacy interests are
present.141
probable cause to search an entire automobile, the automobile exception justifies intrusions
into secondary containers. Powell determined, however, that it was inappropriate to exam-
ine this distinction in Robbins, because the parties had not addressed it and administrative
constraints made it inappropriate to examine such an issue without full adversarial presen-
tation. Id. In contrast, the parties in Ross had litigated this distinction and so the Court
addressed its merits.
135. Justice White dissented separately, reaffirming the plurality opinion in Robbins
and stating that he agreed with much of Marshall's dissent. 102 S. Ct at 2173 (White, J.,
dissenting).
136. Id. at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
The new rule adopted by the Court today is completely incompatible with estab-
lished Fourth Amendment principles, and takes a first step toward an unprece-
dented 'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement. In my view, under
accepted standards, the warrantless search of the container in this case clearly
violates the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
137. Id. at 2173-74.
138. Id. at 2174-75. Specifically, Marshall noted that the warrant requirement (1) limits
the concentration of power held by executive officers over the individual and thereby pre-
vents some unjustified searches from occurring at all; (2) prevents hindsight from coloring
the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search; (3) reassures the public that an orderly
process of law has been respected. Id.
139. Id. at 2175.
140. Id. Justice Marshall explained that mobility justifies a warrantless search because
it puts police in a situation where they must risk losing the car and its contents if they
cannot conduct an immediate search. He suggested that mobility is perhaps a misnomer,
because police can always seize the vehicle and immobilize it. This alternative, however, is
impractical because police will then have to determine what to do with the vehicle and its
occupants while a warrant is being sought. Id. n. 2.
141. Justice Marshall explained that because an individual is deemed to have a lesser
privacy interest in an automobile than in other constitutionally protected areas, application
of the warrant requirement is unnecessary because no significant fourth amendment inter-
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After applying these principles to the search of secondary con-
tainers, Marshall found that neither of the justifications for the
automobile exception justifies the search of secondary containers.142
Because containers can easily be seized, there is no practical exi-
gency present which obviates procurement of a warrant. In addi-
tion, secondary containers do not give rise to diminished privacy
interests.143 Thus, Marshall concluded that a movable container
found in an automobile is entitled to the same amount of fourth
amendment protection as a container found elsewhere.144
Marshall sharply criticized the several justifications proferred
by the majority in support of its holding. He attacked the major-
ity's assumption that the scope of a search pursuant to the auto-
mobile exception is as broad as the scope of a search authorized by
a magistrate. 145 He pointed out that although the issuance of a
warrant need only be supported by probable cause, a warrantless
search requires probable cause plus the existence of a practical
exigency. 146 Consequently, the scope of a warrantless search should
only be as broad as the exigency justifies. Marshall argued that
the majority's premise was unsound because it ignored this critical
distinction.147
Marshall also attacked the majority's purported reliance on an
established precedent. He argued that the majority's conclusion
est is being protected. In addition, where privacy interests are minimal an immediate search
is considered a lesser intrusion than the seizure of the automobile Id. at 2175-76.
142. Id. at 2176.
143. Id. Marshall pointed out that the premise that a seizure may be a greater intrusion
than a search was inapplicable to containers, because an owner of a container will rarely
suffer significant inconvenience as a result of the deprivation of the use of a container. Id.
144. Id. at 2177. Marshall argued that because Ross had placed the evidence at issue in
an opaque, closed bag, the bag could be seized but not searched without a warrant. In
addition, since Ross was arrested and in custody when the search occurred, there was no
practical exigency to justify the warrantless search. Id.
145. Id. at 2176-77. According to Marshall, this assumption arises out of the majority's
characterization of the scope of a permissible search under Carroll, that is, since Carroll
"neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause," the
scope of a search under Carroll is "as broad" as a probable cause search pursuant to a
warrant. Id.
146. Id. at 2177. Justice Marshall states: "It is irrelevant to a magistrate's function
whether the items subject to search are mobile, may be in danger of destruction, or are
impractical to store, or whether an immediate search would be less intrusive than a seizure
without a warrant." Id.
147. Id. Marshall emphasized the majority's disregard for the function of the warrant
requirement. Underlying the majority's reasoning is the assumption that a police officer's
evaluation of probable cause is the equivalent of a magistrate's. Marshall noted that prece-
dent clearly establishes that an "on-the-spot determination of probable cause is never the
same as a decision by a neutral and detached magistrate (emphasis provided)." Id.
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that it would be "illogical" and "absurd" to allow searches of inte-
gral parts of an automobile while prohibiting searches of secon-
dary containers ignores the reasons for including integral parts of
the automobile within the exception. 148 Compartments are included
because they present the same practical problems with mobility
and safekeeping as the automobile itself. Therefore, the privacy
interests focused on by the majority are irrelevant because exi-
gency, not privacy, is the basis for including all of the automobile's
integral parts within the scope of the exception. 149
Similarly, Marshall discerned as improper the majority's ratio-
nale premised on the practical advantages to police. 150 He pointed
out that the automobile exception was not established to provide
the police with an easy means to obtain evidence. 151 Therefore, the
majority's concern over maximization of police efficiency was
improper.
ANALYSIS
In Ross, the Supreme Court established that, when police have
stopped an automobile on the roadway and have probable cause to
search it for contraband or evidence of a crime, they may conduct a
warrantless search which encompasses closed containers as well
as the integral parts of the vehicle itself. Such a warrantless search
is justified under the automobile exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement. Under Ross, once the automobile
exception has been properly invoked, 52 its scope is limited only by
the restrictions which limit the scope of searches authorized by a
warrant: the areas searched must be places where the object of the
search could realistically be secreted. 53 The Ross holding indi-
cates that the Supreme Court has determined that the protections
afforded by the warrant requirement are of little or no significance
in the context of automobile searches. The Court has decided that
148. Id. at 2179.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Ross clearly involved a Carroll-type search since the vehicle was stopped in transit
and the search was conducted immediately. The defendant did not assert that the exception
was inapplicable.
153. The Court explained:
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the
nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined
by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
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the inquiry should focus on the existence of probable cause and
has equated a police officer's assessment of probable cause with
that of a neutral and detached magistrate. 154
Although the justifications supporting the automobile exception
had been critical in the Court's previous decisions, in Ross, the
Court paid little attention to the applicability of these justifications
to secondary containers. It required no showing of the impractica-
bility of securing a warrant.155 Additionally, the Court did not
deem it significant that secondary containers typically manifest a
greater privacy interest than do automobiles themselves. 156 In-
stead, the Court determined that once the exception has been pro-
perly invoked, privacy interests must give way so that the search
may be conducted promptly and efficiently.
The Supreme Court made one careful distinction in Ross which
limits the application of its holding. The Court determined that the
automobile exception can properly be invoked to justify a con-
tainer search only when probable cause to conduct the search
focuses on the entire automobile.15 7 The Court differentiated
"automobile searches" from "container searches." Under Ross, a
"container search" occurs when probable cause focuses on a par-
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen
lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase.
102 S. Ct. at 2172.
154. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
155. The Court did not deem it significant that police have an alternative of seizing a
container and bringing it to a magistrate to obtain a warrant. The only reference the Court
made to the impracticability of this alternative is contained in a footnote where the Court
stated:
Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could be searched
without a warrant, with all wrapped articles and containers found during that
search then taken to a magistrate. But prohibiting police from opening imme-
diately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and
instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the
intrusion on privacy interests.
102 S. Ct. at 2171 n.28.
156. Here, the Court's analysis turns on the fact that permissible intrusion into the
vehicle's compartments and other of its integral parts is equivalent to intrusions into second-
ary containers. Hence, container searches can be justified in the same manner as searches
of the vehicle's integral parts because the fact that containers can be seized has already
been dismissed by the Court as a significant consideration.
157. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. The Court stated that "[p]robable cause to believe that a con-
tainer placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search
of the entire cab." Id. This characterization is implicit in the Court's reconciliation of this
decision with Chadwick and Sanders.
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ticular container, and where that container's relationship with the
vehicle is only incidental. "Container searches" are clearly not
emcompassed by the Ross holding.158 This distinction enabled the
Court to reconcile its holding with both United States v. Chad-
wick 159 and Arkansas v. Sanders.60 According to Ross these
cases were both "container search" cases, and the warrantless
searches were properly invalidated.16
Ross's automobile-container search distinction has several prac-
tical implications. This distinction requires that analysis center on
the nature of the facts giving rise to probable cause to determine
whether a search is an "automobile search," or a "container
search."'1 2 In some cases, this determination may be difficult. As
pointed out by the dissent, the courts will have to determine that
police had knowledge sufficient to formulate probable cause, yet
insufficient knowledge regarding the contraband's precise loca-
tion. 63 As a result, the Court's "bright line" may create difficulties
in application.164
158. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. The court of appeals had considered
the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Ross and had rejected it. The lower court
saw significance in the fact that the Sanders Court had cited United States v. Stevie, 582
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977), as
illustrative of the post-Chadwick misunderstanding among lower courts. The court noted
that in Stevie, probable cause focused on the container placed in the vehicle; however, in
Finnegan, probable cause focused on the automobile itself. Thus, the court concluded that
since the Supreme Court viewed these decisions as inconsistent, "the Sanders majority did
not believe the compatibility of the search with the Fourth Amendment should turn on
whether police suspicion related to the car (as in Finnegan) or to the container (as in
Stevie)." 655 F.2d at 1167. The Supreme Court did not respond to this reasoning in Ross.
159. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
160. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
161. The extent to which Sanders has been reconciled is questionable. The reasoning in
Sanders was premised on the automobile exception. In reaching its conclusion that the
search of the suitcase was impermissible, the Court was construing the scope of the auto-
mobile exception. There are no indications that the Court deemed it significant that probable
cause focused on the suitcase rather than the automobile as a whole. Thus, while the result
in Sanders would be the same under Ross, the rationale of the Sanders Court has been
effectively overruled by the Ross holding.
162. The facts of many cases will lend themselves to straightforward determination
under this distinction. Cases such as Chadwick and Sanders, for example, where probable
cause focused on the container long before it was placed inside the automobile, are clearly
"container searches" under Ross.
163. 102 S. Ct. at 2180 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. It is curious to note that in Sanders the dissenters rejected the validity of this car
search-container search distinction precisely because they felt it might create problems in
application. They stated:
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After Ross, the only container case remaining intact is Chad-
wick. This case escaped modification because it was not decided
under the automobile exception. The Ross Court clearly limited its
holding and discussion to the automobile exception. Thus, Chad-
wick's holding, that all movable containers cannot be subjected to
warrantless searches by way of analogy to automobiles, remains
valid. 165 Robbins v. California,166 however, is clearly
inconsistent with Ross and is impliedly overruled.167 Since Sand-
ers was based on a rationale inconsistent with the one adopted in
Ross, it too has been effectively overruled. 68
Essentially, Ross has reinstated the pre-Chadwick status of the
automobile exception. Prior to Chadwick, courts routinely upheld
Surely ... the intrusion on privacy, and consequently the need for the protection of
the Warrant Clause, is, if anything, greater when police search the entire interior
area of the car, including possibly several suitcases, than when they confine their
search to a single suitcase. Moreover, given the easy transferability of articles to
and from luggage once it is placed in a vehicle, the police would be entitled to
assume that if contraband was not found in the suspect suitcase, it would likely be
secreted somewhere else in the car. The possibility the opinion concurring in the
judgment would preserve for future decision thus contemplates the following two-
step ritual: first, the police would take the targeted suitcase to the station for a
search pursuant to a warrant; then, if the contraband was not discovered in the
suitcase, they would return for a warrantless search of other luggage and com-
partments of the car. It does not require the adjudication of a future controversy to
reject that result.
442 U.S. at 770-71 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun was joined by Justice Rehn-
quist in this dissent. Both Justices joined the majority opinion in Ross. Justice Powell
foresaw similar difficulties in his concurring opinion in Robbins:
Resolving this case by expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attrac-
tive not so much for its logical virtue, but because it may provide ground for
agreement by a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specified guidance to police and courts in this recurring
situation-one that has led to incessant litigation. I note, however, that this
benefit would not be realized fully, as courts may find themselves deciding when
probable cause ripened, or whether suspicion focused on the container or on the
car in which it traveled.
453 U.S. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring).
165. The automobile search-container search distinction seems to preclude recognition
of an exception to the warrant requirement for all movable containers analogous to the
automobile exception. A "movable container" exception would require the establishment of
probable cause to search the container. Ross dictates that once probable cause has focused
on a container, it cannot be searched without a warrant.
166. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
167. The Ross Court acknowledged that the "disposition" of Robbins is inconsistent with
its decision in Ross. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Marshall pointed out in his dissent that the Court
"gingerly avoids stating that it is overruling the case itself' by choice of terms. Id. at 2181.
168. See supra note 161. See also 102 S. Ct. at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting), "[The
Court] rejects all of the relevant reasoning of Sanders and offers a substitute rationale that
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searches of secondary containers under the automobile excep-
tion.169 Ross sanctioned the constitutionality of such searches. 170
Ironically, the Supreme Court has come full circle in its determina-
tion of the permissibility of warrantless container searches under
the automobile exception.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF Ross
Although Ross only involved the container search issue, the
Court's reasoning may be indicative of its future direction with
respect to the automobile exception in general. The resolution of
the container search issue and clear delineation of the scope of the
automobile exception will probably renew concern over the requi-
sites necessary to invoke the exception in the first instance. None
of the cases wherein the Supreme Court construed the scope of the
automobile exception raised this issue because all clearly involved
searches falling within the scope of Carroll v. United States.17 1 As
a result, Ross did not directly resolve the pre-Chadwick confusion
over the permissibility of warrantless automobile searches in the
absence of a practical exigency. The Court's present treatment of
secondary containers, however, is no doubt indicative of the
Court's position on this issue.
Confusion had arisen because Chambers v. Maroney172 and
Cardwell v. Lewis173 departed from the principles laid down in
Carroll. Neither case involved a practical exigency which militated
against the police's ability to obtain a warrant. 74 Nonetheless, the
searches were upheld on the basis of the automobile exception. In
contrast, the search in Coolidge v. New Hampshire7 5 had been
invalidated precisely because the Court found that it was reason-
ably practicable to obtain a warrant. 176 As a result, it remained
uncertain whether police must demonstrate the infeasibility of
obtaining a warrant before the automobile exception may be
appears inconsistent with the result."
169. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
170. The only factor added by Ross is its distinction between car searches and container
searches.
171. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). These cases include Sanders, Robbins, and Ross. All involved
vehicles stopped on the roadway where immediate searches were conducted. Thus, they did
not involve the issues raised in Chambers, Coolidge and CardwelL
172. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
173. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27, 36.
175. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
176. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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invoked. Prior to the Chadwick-Sanders-Robbins line of decisions,
the Supreme Court seemed to be heading towards the elimination
of this consideration. 177 Chadwick, Sanders and Robbins, how-
ever, indicated that this factor was still significant. Those cases
rejected container searches under the automobile exception in part
because the Court determined that the practical problems which
exist in obtaining a warrant to search automobiles do not obtain in
container search situations. 78
Ross represents yet another shift, returning to the position of
Chambers and Cardwell.'7 9 In upholding the permissibility of
warrantless container searches in spite of the fact that containers
can easily be seized until a warrant is obtained, the Court virtually
abandoned consideration of practical exigencies in determining
the scope of the automobile exception. Thus, it is not surprising
that the Court reaffirmed the Chambers holding in the same term
that it decided Ross. In Michigan v. Thomas, °80 the Court reaf-
firmed per curiam the Chambers holding that when police have
probable cause to believe that a vehicle stopped on the roadway
contains contraband, the police may conduct a warrantless search
of the vehicle even after it has been impounded and is in police
custody. 18' With little discussion and no mention of
Coolidge, the Court declared that the justification to search does
not vanish once the car has been immobilized, nor does it depend
on the presence of a likelihood that the car will be driven away or
that its contents will be tampered with during the time when police
177. Chambers, Cardwell, and White indicated that exigency was no longer required.
Coolidge, decided by just a plurality of the Court on this issue, was the only indication of
this requirement's continuing validity.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 56,69,85. In these cases, the Court determined
that practical exigencies were non-existent because containers could easily be seized and
brought to a magistrate for issuance of a search warrant.
179. The precise issue in these two cases was the validity of a delayed warrantless
search conducted when the practical exigency no longer existed, which would clearly have
been permissible if conducted immediately.
180. 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982) (per curiam). In Thomas, police had conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile after its owner was arrested for possession of open intoxicants in a
motor vehicle. A truck was called to tow the automobile and pursuant to a departmental
policy, an officer searched the vehicle prior to its impoundment. The search uncovered two
bags of marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment, and a loaded .38 caliber revolver in
the air vents under the dashboard. The defendant was convicted for possession of a con-
cealed weapon but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. Although generally upholding
inventory searches of impounded vehicles, the court invalidated this search because by
extending to the air vents, it was unreasonable in scope. Id. at 3080.
181. In addition to citing Chambers as supporting this holding, the Court cited Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) and United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
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seek a warrant.182 Thus, any doubt about the continuing existence
of the practical exigency requirement appears to have been laid to
rest by this decision. 83
At this point, however, it is unclear what the status of Coolidge
is and whether the Supreme Court will extend the automobile
exception to encompass the search of parked vehicles such as those
involved in Coolidge and Cardwell. While the Ross majority never
explicitly discussed parked vehicles,184 the dissenters viewed the
majority's holding as restricted to cars stopped in transit. 85 The
majority's rationale, on the other hand, would appear to permit
recognition of such an extension in a future case. If practical exi-
gencies are no longer required, it is difficult to see how a parked
vehicle differs from one stopped on a highway, as long as there is
probable cause to justify the search.
In addition, Ross gives a broad reading to the diminished expec-
tation of privacy which attaches to automobiles. Its holding
implies that the diminished privacy interest encompasses the
entire vehicle, as well as anything located within the vehicle. 8 6
Thus, if diminished privacy interests alone are sufficient to justify
a warrantless probable cause search, parked vehicles would also
fall within the automobile exception. 187
182. 102 S. Ct. at 3081.
183. It is interesting to note that the Court need not have reaffirmed the Chambers
principle in order to uphold the search in this case. Here, the search was conducted on-the-
scene rather than at the station house. Thus, the search could probably have been sustained
on the authority of Carroll alone. In addition, the Court identified that there were exigencies
present because the occupants of the vehicle could have had unknown confederates who
might have returned to remove the secreted contraband. Nonetheless, the Court pointedly
held that the existence of such exigencies was not required to invoke the automobile excep-
tion. Id.
184. The majority opinion contained references only to cars stopped by police such as
the car involved in Carroll.
185. See Marshall, J., dissenting- "The Court confines its holding today to automobiles
stopped on the highway which police have probable cause to believe contain contraband. I
do not understand the Court to address the applicability of the automobile exception rule
announced today to parked cars. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)." 102
S. Ct. at 2174 n.1.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
187. It is interesting to note that the vehicle in Ross was parked just moments before the
police conducted the search. See supra text accompanying notes 101.02. The question which
remains open is whether police could have conducted the warrantless search while the
vehicle was still parked and unoccupied. Technically, Carroll, Chambers, Ross, and
Thomas do not authorize such a search. However, if such is the rule, once police have
probable cause to search a vehicle, they could place it under surveillance until it was moved
and then conduct a warrantless search. The Court has clearly indicated its disapproval for a
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of the way in which the Supreme Court resolves the
unanswered issue of parked vehicles, it is evident that further clar-
ification in this area is necessary if the Court truly wishes to
achieve clarity and consistency in the law of automobile search.
The Court has evidenced a desire to establish guidelines which can
easily be applied by both law enforcement officials and courts.
Ross accomplishes much of this objective with respect to the scope
of the search conducted under the automobile exception. The
Court's goal of clarity, however, will not fully be realized until the
Court clearly delineates the requisites necessary to invoke the
exception. If Ross is any indication of the direction that the Court
is taking in this area, the automobile is well on its way to becoming
a "talisman in whose presence the fourth amendment fades away
and disappears."'' 8 8
MARY C. GILHOOLY
rule that enables police to avoid the warrant requirement in this manner. In Coolidge, the
Court indicated that when police have preexisting probable cause to seize and search con-
tainers, they are not entitled to wait until they are placed in a vehicle to take advantage of
the automobile exception. To avoid an analogous result with respect to parked vehicles,
some further clarification of Ross is required.
188. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 461.
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